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The role of viral genomics in understanding COVID-19 
outbreaks in long-term care facilities 
Dinesh Aggarwal, Richard Myers, William L Hamilton, Tehmina Bharucha, Niamh M Tumelty, Colin S Brown, Emma J Meader, Tom Connor, 
Darren L Smith, Declan T Bradley, Samuel Robson, Matthew Bashton, Laura Shallcross, Maria Zambon, Ian Goodfellow, Meera Chand, 
Justin O’Grady, M Estée Török, Sharon J Peacock, Andrew J Page, The COVID-19 Genomics UK (COG-UK) Consortium*
We reviewed all genomic epidemiology studies on COVID-19 in long-term care facilities (LTCFs) that had been 
published to date. We found that staff and residents were usually infected with identical, or near identical, SARS-CoV-2 
genomes. Outbreaks usually involved one predominant cluster, and the same lineages persisted in LTCFs despite 
infection control measures. Outbreaks were most commonly due to single or few introductions followed by a spread 
rather than a series of seeding events from the community into LTCFs. The sequencing of samples taken consecutively 
from the same individuals at the same facilities showed the persistence of the same genome sequence, indicating that 
the sequencing technique was robust over time. When combined with local epidemiology, genomics allowed probable 
transmission sources to be better characterised. The transmission between LTCFs was detected in multiple studies. 
The mortality rate among residents was high in all facilities, regardless of the lineage. Bioinformatics methods were 
inadequate in a third of the studies reviewed, and reproducing the analyses was difficult because sequencing data 
were not available in many facilities.
Introduction 
Many studies of COVID-19 in long-term care facilities 
(LTCFs) have reported high mortality.1–3 Possible 
explanations for this finding include recognised risk 
factors such as increased age and comorbidities.2,4 In 
England and Wales, it has been estimated that nearly 
30% (15 819 of 54 325 total in the week ending 
Oct 16, 2020) of all deaths due to COVID-19 occurred in 
LTCFs5 with outbreaks reported in 45% of all LTCFs.6 
Northern Ireland reported even higher rates; 37% (363 of 
988 total in the week ending Oct 23, 2020) of deaths in 
LTCFs were due to COVID-19. Globally, 24·9% of 
superspreading events7 were linked to LTCFs.8 The 
drivers for the introduction and transmission of 
SARS-CoV-2 in the care sector are under investigation 
and are incompletely understood.
There are multiple tools available to investigate and 
manage SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks. These include: survei-
llance-based testing, where PCR testing is preferred to 
the serology testing of staff and residents; the testing of 
individuals who are symptomatic with PCR testing; the 
identification and self-isolation of close contacts; 
environmental measures such as disinfection; personal 
protective equipment use; and the self-isolation of 
individuals who test positive.9 The genome sequencing 
of SARS-CoV-2 has been established as a powerful 
supplementary tool to characterise the transmission 
dynamics in health-care settings.10–12 This method entails 
the investigation of the genetic relatedness of appro-
priately assembled SARS-CoV-2 sequences, with multiple 
tools available to identify clusters of infection. The 
genomic epidemiological investigations of outbreaks are 
effective in ruling out links between clusters suggested 
through contact tracing.13 However, SARS-CoV-2 
sequencing alone can encounter limitations, such as 
difficulty in proving the directionality of the spread 
or little genomic diversity falsely showing possible 
transmission events; these limitations can be overcome 
by integrating this information with epidemiological 
data.14,15 This integration can enable the investigation of 
the dynamics of outbreaks within and between LTCFs 
and the wider community.
Several studies have used genomic epidemiology to 
advance the understanding of the transmission of 
SARS-CoV-2 within LTCFs. These studies vary in size, 
methods used, and quality. Here, we review the available 
genomic epidemiology studies on COVID-19 in LTCFs 
that have been done to date and provide a summary and 
interpretation of the key findings (table 1; appendix).
Study screening 
The database searches identified 110 studies. After the 
removal of duplicates and the addition of papers 
identified through the hand-searching of preprint 
servers, there were 55 studies remaining. An independent 
review by authors of this study (AJP and NMT) of titles 
and abstracts identified 27 studies for full text review. 
After a full text review, 11 genomic epidemiology studies 
in LTCFs were identified for inclusion in this analysis.
Study characteristics and quality of outcome 
measures 
Of the 11 studies included, five were done in the USA, 
four in the UK, and two in the Netherlands. These studies 
included a wide range of the number of LTCFs (1–292), 
participants (10–6600), and positive cases (6–1167). 
Six studies reported findings from the prospective 
surveillance of individuals and five studies reported 
genomic sequencing findings that occurred in relation 
to an outbreak investigation. The serial sampling of 
residents and health-care workers provided information 
about the duration of infection in individuals, the 
duration of outbreaks in LTCFs, and the reproducibility 
of genome sequencing and lineage identification.28 
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Nine studies sequenced both staff and patients to better 
understand the transmission dynamics within a LTCF. 
One study assessed transmission in staff alone25 and one 
study in patients alone.27 The studies were done between 
February and August, 2020. The study characteristics are 
detailed in table 2. Bioinformatics methods differed 
between studies, tailored to the sequencing technologies 
(Illumina, San Diego, CA, USA, or Oxford Nanopore 
Technologies, Oxford, UK) and sample preparation 
methods (ARTIC amplicon,29,30 metagenomic, and whole 
genome sequencing), meaning that direct comparisons 
cannot be made because of the differing methods. Three 
studies were found to display deficiencies relating to the 
bioinformatics methods used or the results presented. 
These deficiencies included assembling amplicons,20 
using poor-quality sequencing data in phylogenetic 
analysis,21 and imputing reference bases to replace 
missing bases;25 the effect of these methods on down-
stream analysis is unknown.
Most studies did phylogenetic analysis of their datasets 
as a final step and presented the results as a dendrogram. 
Of the 11 included studies, the open source bioinformatics 
software IQ-TREE31 was used in eight studies, PhyML32 was 
used in one study, a combination of Molecular Evolutionary 
Genetics Analysis across computing platforms33 software 
and commercial software Geneious (Biomatters, Auckland, 
New Zealand) was used in two studies, and the software 
used was not stated in one study. One study also did an 
analysis with Bayesian Evolutionary Analysis Sampling 
Trees version 2.6.2.23 The way in which the analysis was 
done differed greatly, which had an effect on the granularity 
presented and largely prevented direct comparisons. 
Three studies defined a consistent method in their 
study to identify clusters.18,19,27 These studies used 
Phylogenetic Assignment of Named Global Outbreak 
Lineages software or a more granular clustering algorithm 
in the COVID-19 Genomics UK (COG-UK) Consortium 
pipeline,19 transcluster algorithm,18 or single nucleotide 
poly morphism (SNP) distance.27 One study provides a 
rationale for how clusters were identified without providing 
a defined criteria for selecting genomic clusters.23
Furthermore, assuming a mutation rate of approxi-
mately 2·5 SNPs per month19 allows for the estimation 
of the amount of variation expected in a phylogeny at 
any particular timepoint in a series. Additionally, only 
two studies mention the use of negative controls18,19 and no 
studies have released the sequencing reads found in the 
negative controls publicly. Many sample preparation 
protocols use amplification tech niques that can also 
amplify contamination and give false results, particularly 
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Location Start and end 























March–April Surveillance 2 621 NR 133 22 3
van den 
Besselaar et al 
(2021)17
South Holland May–June Outbreak 1 425 113 56 60§ 1
Hamilton et al 
(2021)18
East of England, 
UK
February–May Surveillance 292 6600 1167 NR 700 409
Page et al 
(2021)19
Norfolk, UK March–August Surveillance 6 1035 76 9 and 3¶ 89 2
Graham et al 
(2020)20
London, UK April Outbreak 4 383 126 3 19|| NR
Ladhani et al 
(2020)21 and 
Ladhani et al 
(2020)22
London, UK April Outbreak 6 518 105 53 99 2




January–May Surveillance 1 194 82 36 83 3
Zhang et al 
(2020)24
CA, USA March–April Surveillance 2 10 6 and 1** 3 192 1
Gallichote et al 
(2020)25‡
CO, USA Unknown Surveillance 5 454 NR 70 38 1
Taylor et al 
(2020)26
MN, USA April–June Outbreak 2 600 165 114 105 4
Arons et al 
(2020)27
WA, USA March Outbreak 1 89 57 26 34 2
LTCFs=long-term care facilities. NR=not reported. *Surveillance studies are defined as those which involve serial testing to identify positive cases, and outbreak investigations 
are those which involve the testing or sequencing, or both, of positivity after a case (or a defined number of cases) of SARS-CoV-2 have been identified. †Clusters are not 
uniformly defined in all papers. ‡Preprint before peer review. §Six of these samples were from an epidemiologically linked hospital outbreak. ¶Family members of a single 
staff member. ||Paper states both 17 and 19 samples sequenced, so it is not clear which is correct. **Family member of resident.
Table 1: Overview of studies using SARS-CoV-2 genome sequencing of samples taken for routine surveillance or during investigation of outbreaks in LTCFs
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when the viral load in the source material is low.18,19,20,25 
Without having all underlying raw data (including controls) 
alongside the sample preparation and sequencing meta-
data,34 reanalysis and comparison between studies is 
difficult and prone to error.
Many studies publicly release their raw sequencing 
data or consensus or assembled genomes, or a combi-
nation,18,19,23,24 through the International Nucleotide 
Sequence Database Collaboration (INSDC)35 and the 
Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Influenza Data 
(GISAID).36 This sharing allows for independent 
reanalysis, overcoming the effect of variation among 
methods between studies.
However, in genomics it is a common poor practice to 
not release data publicly or to provide insufficient 
metadata, such as accession numbers, thus making 
reanalysis unfeasible. The use of open metadata 
standards that are internationally agreed upon for 
SAR-CoV-2 genomics enables genomic epidemiology 
on a global scale. In some cases, there are legitimate 
reasons to withhold data, such as to maintain patient 
confidentiality where identification might be possible 
(eg, as a result of small sample numbers or the location 
of LTCFs). In other cases, even if the authors wish to 
deposit all clinically important samples, some of their 
samples might not meet the minimum quality-control 
thresholds (>90% completeness for GISAID) enforced by 
the public databases (to aid high-quality phylogenetic 
analysis). For example, samples with a low viral load 
often sequence poorly, leading to incomplete datasets 
and making reanalysis impossible. Researchers might 
have a well meaning desire to make publicly available 
data that does not meet the stringent quality-control 
thresholds by imputing missing data from a reference 
genome,25 a common technique in human genetics, but 
this leads to erroneous results in the phylogenetic 
analysis of SARS-CoV-2. These high-quality thresholds 
on data inhibit reanalysis and reduce available data. The 
COG-UK Consortium has overcome this challenge by 
making these data available on their website and through 
the INSDC, which has lower quality-control thresholds 
than GISAID (>50% genome completeness). Con-
vergence on a small number of open-source bioinfor-
matics workflows using best practices should mitigate 
future issues in this regard (eg, a Nextflow pipeline 
with a focus on COVID-19, one global resource on the 
Galaxy platform for the analysis of SARS-CoV-2 data, and 
a workspace on the Terra app with COVID-19 genomic 
data and workflows.
Summary of findings 
To date, genomic epidemiology studies of SARS-CoV-2 in 
LTCFs provide many insights into transmission in this 
susceptible population. The diversity of studies ranged 
from outbreak investigations with detailed epidemio logical 
data in single LTCFs to the prospective surveillance of 
hundreds of LTCFs, as summarised earlier. Key findings 
from the included studies are shown in the panel.
Location Sample preparation 
method
Sequencing Method of genome 
construction strategy








Amplicon Nanopore Consensus NR Not available 
van den Besselaar 
et al (2021)17
South Holland Amplicon Nanopore Consensus IQ-TREE Not available 
Hamilton et al 
(2021)18
East of England, 
UK
Amplicon† Nanopore or Illumina Consensus IQ-TREE and PhyML Available but not 
linked
Page et al (2021)19 Norfolk, UK Amplicon† Illumina Consensus IQ-TREE Available
Graham et al 
(2020)20
London Amplicon† Illumina Reference-guided 
assembly
IQ-TREE Not available
Ladhani et al 
(2020)21
London Whole genome 
sequencing
Illumina Consensus IQ-TREE Available but not 
linked




Metagenomic Illumina Reference-guided 
assembly




Zhang et al (2020)24 CA, USA Metagenomic Illumina Consensus IQ-TREE Available
Gallichote et al 
(2020)25
CO, USA Amplicon† Illumina Consensus gap filled 
with reference
Geneious Not available
Taylor et al (2020)26 MN, USA Amplicon† NR NR IQ-TREE Available but not 
linked
Arons et al (2020)27 WA, USA NR Nanopore Consensus Geneious Available
NR=not reported. The companies for the sequencing methods are: Nanopore, Oxford Nanopore Technologies, Oxford, UK, and Illumina, San Diego, CA, USA. *If data are 
present in the Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Influenza Data or the International Nucleotide Sequence Database Collaboration database they are labelled as available, and 
when there is no linkage information between the samples used in the article and the data in the public archives, they are labelled as not linked. †Amplicon sequencing uses 
the ARTIC protocol.29
Table 2: Sequencing and bioinformatics methods used in the long-term care facilities genomic epidemiology studies
For the COG-UK Consortium, 
see https://www.cogconsortium.
uk/
For the Nextflow pipeline, see 
https://github.com/connor-lab/
ncov2019-artic-nf
For the Galaxy resource, see 
https://covid19.galaxyproject.
org
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Large outbreaks in LTCFs, such as in the study by 
Lemieux and colleagues,23 generally shared the same 
characteristics: a single cluster with rapid expansion, 
resulting in most samples being identical or near 
identical (only a one SNP difference). Residents and 
staff, including staff who had no contact with residents, 
were usually infected with the same (identical) genome 
sequence. The direction of transmission cannot be 
established from genomic data alone, but the addition of 
traditional epidemiological data (such as sample dates 
and the co-location of individuals) might allow inferences 
to be drawn. In many outbreaks more than one cluster 
was observed,18 but these sporadic introductions usually 
represented only a few facilities. The temporal analysis of 
genomic data allows estimation of when an introduction 
into a LTCF is likely to have occurred, making genomics 
useful for providing an estimate for when an outbreak 
began.23 The paper by Lemieux and colleagues23 in 
Boston, MA, USA, estimated that, after an introduction, 
85% of residents were infected within 2–3 weeks, despite 
extensive infection prevention and control measures 
being in place. By the time two symptomatic individuals 
are identified in a LTCF, the outbreak is likely to already 
be widespread.21,27
An analysis of lineages circulating in a region compared 
with lineages found within LTCFs19,23 show that there is 
little diversity within LTCFs, indicating a small number 
of introductions rather than repeated introductions from 
the community. Distinct clusters are usually (but not 
always) seen between LTCFs,18 with genomics identifying 
a small number of shared genomic clusters in different 
LTCFs.18,19,21 Taking the sequence diversity found in 
292 LTCFs in a region18 as a whole and comparing it to a 
similar number of residents not in a LTCF in the same 
region, similar numbers of SNP differences were 
identified in the genomes (the median number of SNP 
differences in residents in a LTCF was eight, and in 
residents not in a LTCF was nine). When looking at a 
single LTCF,19 knowing the diversity of the circulating 
lineages within the locality helped to rule out local inward 
transmission.
Looking more closely at the dynamics of an outbreak, 
the study by Arons and colleagues27 in WA, USA, 
overlayed unique sequences to a map of the residents’ 
bedrooms and showed a clear spatial signal, with 
residents more likely to be infected with identical 
genome sequences if their bedrooms were in close 
proximity, even with strict infection controls. Genome 
sequencing also identified examples of links between 
outbreaks at LTCFs located in the same geographical 
areas.19,21 In one study,18 two LTCFs located within 1 km of 
each other had residents infected with identical genomes; 
a paramedic who visited both facilities also tested 
positive. In another study19 a genetically distinct sub-
lineage was found in six different LTCFs within one 
small region. Genomics reveals that the inter-LTCF 
transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is a real risk, and is 
potentially enabled by the use of shared staff or temporary 
agency workers.
When there is an outbreak at a LTCF, the genomes 
identified in residents and staff, including non-health-care 
workers, are usually the same. A high percentage of 
asymptomatic individuals is common, with staff usually 
accounting for a higher percentage of those who are 
asymptomatic. Therefore, the same SARS-CoV-2 genome 
can result in both symptomatic and asymptomatic 
infections. It is important to include staff in testing, 
although it has been noted that participation rates are often 
low.26 Even with intensive consecutive testing every week, 
enhanced infection control, and the transfer of residents 
who test positive to dedicated isolation units, the outbreak 
continued in the study in MN, USA, with the genomically 
similar clusters found over an extended period of time.26
Panel: Key findings
Community or hospital acquisition of SARS-CoV-2 in residents of LTCFs
1 Most LTCF infections were community-acquired (moderate).18,19
2 Approximately 6% of residents with SARS-CoV-2 infection in LTCFs had suspected or 
confirmed hospital-acquired infections in one UK region (moderate).18
3 Little genomic diversity among the SARS-CoV-2 infections in staff and residents from 
the same LTCFs. This finding indicated a small number of introductions rather than a 
series of seeding events from the community (weak).16,19,21,23,26 
4 Shared clusters between separate LTCFs could be identified (moderate).18,19,21
Transmission and outcomes within LTCFs
5 The use of genomic data allowed independent clusters of infections to be identified 
within LTCFs (strong).17,18,20,21,23,26,27
6 In LCTF outbreaks, initial sequencing was useful to identify whether genomes were 
similar, but the subsequent sequencing of large numbers of samples did not add much 
value (moderate).23,26
7 Once two symptomatic individuals were identified in a LTCF, the outbreak was already 
widespread (moderate).27
8 The sequencing of samples taken consecutively from the same residents of LTCFs 
showed that viral lineages persisted over an extended period of time despite infection 
prevention and control measures. It also showed that the sequencing technique was 
reproducible (moderate).26
9 Residents of LTCFs were more likely to be infected with identical genome sequences if 
their bedrooms were in close proximity to each other (moderate).27
10 The mortality rate among residents of LTCFs was high in all facilities, with no link to 
particular lineages (moderate).20,21,26
11) The temporal analysis of genomic data allows for the estimation of when an 
introduction was likely to have occurred (moderate).23
Reproducibility of genomic analysis
12 The genomic studies reviewed commonly misapplied bioinformatics methods 
(strong).20,21,25
13 Minimum quality thresholds set by public archives on SARS-CoV-2 data limit data 
availability and reproducibility (moderate).18,19,21
14 Most studies did not provide adequate epidemiological data or metadata to allow 
analysis to be reproduced (strong).16–18,20,21,25,26
Strength of findings: strong indicates multiple sources of evidence, supported by in-depth analysis or experiments; moderate 
indicates one or more sources of evidence, supported by analysis or experiments; weak indicates one or more sources of 
evidence that are potentially contradictory. LTCFs=long-term care facilities.
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The intensive sequencing of all residents and staff in 
an outbreak does not appear to provide additional 
genomic information after the first few sequences.17 The 
strategic subsampling of staff and residents should be 
adequate to understand the number of clusters and their 
relative proportions. However, inadequate sampling 
does have a large effect on the usefulness of genomics.25 
Genomics has reduced usefulness once there is a large 
outbreak; however, it does provide useful information 
about how SARS-CoV-2 might enter a care home, such as 
via staff or patient movements,18 and continued ongoing 
monitoring using genomics can identify new sources of 
infection (new seeding events), which can help to inform 
policy.18,27 Because visitors were restricted from visiting 
LTCFs early in the pandemic, no data are available on 
their role as a source of introduction.
Genomes sequenced through prospective surveillance 
have proven to be useful for identifying linked outbreaks 
that might have been missed otherwise.10,18,19,24 The 
limitation is that it might take time for an outbreak to be 
recognised through surveillance activities, where even if 
the intention is to sequence every positive sample, a large 
percentage of genome sequences are not available.18,19
Residents of LTCFs who develop severe COVID-19 are 
often admitted to hospital, which might be the first 
indication of an outbreak. Samples that are sequenced as 
part of surveillance studies can provide early insight into 
outbreaks in LTCFs.18,19,23,24 5·8% of COVID-19 infections in 
residents of LTCFs were suspected to be acquired in 
hospital.18 Furthermore, 33·1% of patients were discharged 
within 7 days of their first positive test and could therefore 
have been infectious at the time of hospital discharge. 
These findings have important implications for infection 
control in LTCFs and for public health policies.18
So far, most genomic epidemiology studies of 
SARS-CoV-2 in LTCFs have been done in the UK, the 
Netherlands, and the USA. Furthermore, two thirds of 
the global SARS-CoV-2 genomes sequenced to date have 
been generated by the COG-UK Consortium. This 
endeavour has enabled detailed analyses on a large scale, 
but also introduced a risk of bias. The dynamics of 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission in LTCFs in other countries 
might be different.
Recommendations 
It is clear from the studies summarised here that gen-
omics play a crucial role in understanding the 
transmission dynamics within LTCFs. Having reviewed 
the available literature, we have drafted some recom-
mendations for the use of genomics to evaluate 
SARS-CoV-2 in LTCFs, which are summarised in table 3.
All staff working in a LTCF (regardless of their role) 
should be treated as a single cohort and subject to 
infection prevention and control measures that are 
uniform, including the appropriate use of personal 
protective equipment, regular screening for SARS-CoV-2, 
and genome sequencing of any positive samples. 
Genome sequencing has shown that staff who do not 
have direct contact with residents have the same lineages 
in an outbreak as residents and staff with direct contact 
with residents. The early identification and exclusion of 
asymptomatic staff through regular screening might 
reduce the risk of transmission to residents and other 
staff. However, it should be noted that the regular 
screening of staff for asymptomatic infections might still 
sometimes be unable to identify an individual who is 
infectious, and that could lead to a superspreading 
event.37
Sequencing every genome in an outbreak is not 
recommended because it provides rapidly diminishing 




Effect of these 
measures
Transmission of SARS-CoV-2
Limiting the spread of SARS-CoV-2 between hospitals, health-care 
workers, and residents of LTCFs is an urgently needed infection 
control measure and public health priority
2–5, 8–10 Control 
transmission
All staff, not just individuals with direct contact with residents, 
should be treated as one cohort and subject to the same infection 
prevention and control measures
3 Control 
transmission
Genomics identifies transmission between staff, between staff and 




Clustering based on physical proximity to the bedroom of a resident 
infected with SARS-CoV-2 supports its use as an additional factor to 





A targeted approach weighted towards sequencing early positive 
samples in an outbreak coupled with potential epidemiological links 
can help to highlight the source of introduction; widespread 
sequencing within a care home is unlikely to yield substantially more 
information
3–4, 6, 8 Control 
transmission and 
resource allocation
Genomic surveillance in a proportion of samples from LTCFs should 
be done including both patients and staff, allowing the genomic 
epidemiology of a LTCF to be put into context
3–4, 6–8, 11 Control 
transmission and 
resource allocation
Residents with a recent hospital admission who subsequently test 
positive should have their genome sequenced to identify the 
hospital seeding of outbreaks in LTCFs
2, 5 Control 
transmission and 
resource allocation
Ongoing community surveillance with SARS-CoV-2 sequencing 
allows outbreaks in LTCFs to be better characterised
1–2, 3–4 Control 
transmission and 
resource allocation
Recommendations for future research
Modelling of subsampling strategies within LTCFs is needed to 




Epidemiological and genomic data should be released to public 




Appropriate and validated bioinformatics methods should be 
applied to genomic analysis with domain experts reviewing results 




A focus on rapid integrated epidemiological and genomic analysis 
will have the most clinical benefit




Table 3: Recommendations for measures derived from the use of SARS-CoV-2 genomics in LTCFs
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samples should be undertaken. The strategy for 
sequencing positive samples should be weighted towards 
staff rather than residents because they are at risk of 
community acquisition and subsequent transmission, 
whereas residents are less likely to have external contact. 
The modelling of subsampling strategies within LTCFs is 
needed.
Once a resident in a LTCF tests positive, other residents 
with bedrooms in close proximity should be considered 
to be at a high risk of infection, regardless of contact 
patterns and other infection control measures, because 
genomics shows identical genomes are more likely to be 
found in those in close proximity.
Residents who have had a recent hospital admission 
and who subsequently test positive (within 14 days of 
hospital discharge) should have their viral genomes 
sequenced to distinguish hospital-acquired acquisition 
from care-home acquisition, thus informing outbreak 
investigation and management. Limiting the spread of 
COVID-19 between residents in LTCFs, health-care 
workers, and hospitals should be a key target for infection 
control and prevention.
Raw sequencing data and consensus or assembled 
genomes should be made available in the public archives 
Search strategy and selection criteria
The studies we included in this Review were identified by 
searches of PubMed, Web of Science, and Scopus from 
Jan 1 to Nov 3, 2020. We used the search terms (“COVID-19” 
OR “SARS-CoV-2”) and (“long term care facility”, “care home”, 
“skilled nursing facility”, “nursing home” or “residential 
home”) and (“sequenc*” or “genom*” or “WGS”) to identify 
relevant English-language publications and preprints since 
January, 2020. Because of the limitations of the systematic 
search functionality on medRxiv and bioRxiv, these servers 
were hand-searched for additional papers that met the 
inclusion criteria. We focused particularly on studies where 
genomic epidemiology was used to enhance the 
interpretation of outbreaks. Articles that did not use genomic 
sequencing as a method were excluded. Studies were 
screened by authors NMT and AJP. The subsequent reported 
outcomes were extracted (where documented): the location 
of the study, the time period, number of long-term care 
facilities involved, the total number of positive cases broken 
down by staff and residents, the total number of genomes 
sequenced, the wider effect, the sample preparation 
methods, the sequencing equipment used, the genome 
creation method, the phylogeny, and the data availability. 
We report on the practical difficulties if reanalysis was 
attempted, and do not formally attempt to reproduce the 
analyses presented. Papers were classified as follows: 
outbreak investigation, surveillance, first case, and genomic 
reanalysis of public data. Because this topic is a rapidly 
emerging field of research, preprints were included but it 
should be noted that these are not peer-reviewed.
in a timely manner with the inter nationally recommended 
minimal set of metadata to enable genomic epide-
miological analysis at local, national, and international 
levels.34 This data sharing is essential to provide context 
for transmission analysis and outbreak investigations. 
Bioinformatics analysis of viral data requires additional 
considerations compared with other organisms. To 
increase the quality of the analysis, and reduce the 
probability of missing one of these domain-specific 
considerations, we recommend the use of validated and 
tested SARS-CoV-2 pipelines, with the involvement of 
domain-specific experts to assist with the analysis and 
review of results.
A follow-up of the study done in London, UK, by 
Ladhani and colleagues38 using serological testing 
showed that by 5 weeks, most individuals had 
seroconverted, including 66·4% of staff and 67·0% of 
residents who were asymptomatic and tested negative by 
RT-PCR.38 This finding highlights the need to combine 
various surveillance methods, including genomic 
epidemiology, to accurately characterise the dynamics of 
transmission within LTCFs; this is planned in a pro-
spective study across 105 care homes in the UK.39
Ultimately, genomics provides the most clinical benefit 
and insight if it is integrated with detailed epidemiological 
data in a timely fashion. Meredith and colleagues10 
established weekly infection prevention control meetings, 
combining phylogenetic analysis to assist outbreak 
investigation and contact-tracing efforts at a health-care 
facility. Furthermore, although the routine genomic 
surveillance of hospital patients and staff, residents and 
staff at LTCFs, and community cases will provide greater 
insight into transmission dynamics, integrating additional 
epidemiological information such as hospital discharges, 
patient movements, and discharge locations would provide 
a much more informative approach. We recommend a 
focus not only on rapidly generating and analysing 
sequencing data, but also on rapidly collecting and 
integrating epidemiological data, which is often held in 
many different databases in different organisations. The 
ability to combine genomic and epidemiological analysis 
in a clinically actionable time frame (days rather than 
months) is crucial for leveraging the clinical benefits of 
sequencing.
Conclusions 
We have presented findings from multiple genomic 
epidemiology studies of transmission in LTCFs in an 
evolving pandemic. We have amalgamated the data to 
provide clinical recommendations from the findings and 
recommendations for refining methods for such studies 
in the future. Genomics can help to understand the initial 
seeding of outbreaks in LTCFs. For example, they can link 
existing outbreaks to other LTCFs, identify the likelihood 
of inter-LTCF transmission, and link outbreaks to hospital 
cases, indicating nosocomial infection. Placing these 
outbreaks in the context of the wider circulating lineages 
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in the locality also provides information about routes of 
transmission. For example, this method can separate 
local community transmission from other routes of 
transmission, which informs policy and helps to limit 
future outbreaks. The genome sequencing of SARS-CoV-2 
has been proven to provide useful insights into the 
transmission and dynamics of outbreaks. Prospective 
genomic surveillance provides a backbone of information, 
helping to inform outbreak analysis. Hidden transmission 
links are uncovered using genomics that help with the 
interpretation of epidemiology and with contract-tracing 
efforts. Consecutive sampling provides yet more insight 
into virus longevity and transmission within LTCFs, and 
the reproducibility of genome sequencing for lineage 
identification when the same patient is sampled and 
genome sequencing is done repeatedly. The ability to 
integrate epidemiological and genomic analysis in a 
clinically actionable timeframe is a major challenge to 
realising the clinical benefits of genomics.
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